Affiliate networks are an inseparable part of the cybercrime ecosystem. Largely based on their win-win revenue sharing model, throughout the years, they’ve successfully established themselves as a crucial part of the cybercrime growth model, further ensuring that a cybercriminal will indeed receive a financial incentive for his fraudulent/malicious activities online. From pharmaceutical affiliate networks, iPhone selling affiliate networks, to affiliate networks for pirated music and OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) software, cybercriminals continue to professionally monetize each and every aspect of the underground marketplace, on their way to harness the experience, know-how and traffic acquisitions capabilities of fellow cybercriminals. In this […]
Posts Categorized: Mobile
Back in June, 2013, we offered a peek inside a DIY Android .apk decompiler/injector that was not only capable of ‘binding’ malicious Android malware to virtually any legitimate app, but also, was developed to work exclusively with a publicly obtainable Android-based trojan horse. In this post, I’ll profile a similar, recently released cybercrime-friendly Windows-based tool that’s capable of generating malicious ‘sensitive information stealing’ Android .apk apps, emphasize on its core features, and most importantly, discuss in depth the implications this type of tool could have on the overall state of the Android malware market. More details:
By Nathan Collier Last Friday we blogged about the radical Android OS bug 8219321, better known as the “Master Key” bug, which was reported by Bluebox Security. Check out last weeks blog if you haven’t already: “The implications are huge!” – The Master Key Bug. We mentioned how we have been diligently working on protecting those not yet covered by patches or updates, and finding a solution for older devices as well. We are happy to report we have the solution! The newest version of Webroot SecureAnywhere Mobile with a patch for the “Master Key” bug can be found on the […]
By Nathan Collier and Cameron Palan Last week, Bluebox Security reported they’d found a new flaw with the Android OS, saying “The implications are huge!”. The bug, also known as the “Master Key” bug or “bug 8219321”, can be exploited as a way to modify Android application files, specifically the code within them, without breaking the cryptographic signature. We call these signatures the “digital certificate”, and they are used to verify the app’s integrity. Since the bug is able to modify an application and still have the certificate appear valid, it is a big deal.
In May of 2012, we highlighted the increasing public availability of managed SMS spam services that can send hundreds of thousands of SMS messages across multiple verticals. These services are assisted through the use of proprietary or publicly obtainable phone number harvesting and verifying DIY applications. In this post, I’ll profile one of the most recently advertised managed mobile phone number harvesting service which allows full customization of the harvesting criteria based on the specific requirements of the customer. More details:
By Nathan Collier There’s one variant of Android.Bankun that is particularly interesting to me. When you look at the manifest it doesn’t have even one permission. Even wallpaper apps have internet permissions. Having no permissions isn’t a red flag for being malicious though. In fact, it may even make you lean towards it being legitimate. There is one thing that thing that gives Android.Bankun a red flag though. The package name of com.google.bankun instantly makes me think something is fishy. To the average user the word ‘Google’ is seen as a word to be trusted. This is especially true when […]
On their way to acquire the latest and coolest Android game or application, end users with outdated situational awareness on the latest threats facing them often not only undermine the confidentiality and integrity of their devices, but also, can unknowingly expose critical business data to the cybercriminals who managed to infect their devices. How are cybercriminals achieving this in times when Google is automatically scanning all submissions to the Google Play store, and is also verifying the applications to prevent the abuse of potential installations from untrusted third-party stores/application download locations? Easier than you to think, especially with the recent […]
The workplace technology landscape has changed dramatically over the past five years, and the security threats have changes along with it. Here are the growing factors that IT professionals can’t afford to ignore, all in a beautiful infographic.
One of the most common myths regarding the emerging TDoS (Telephony Denial of Service) market segment, portrays a RBN (Russian Business Network) type of bulletproof infrastructure used to launch these attacks. The infrastructure’s speculated resilience is supposed to be acting as a foundation for the increase of TDoS services and products. Fact or fiction? Keep reading. In this post, we’ll profile a SIP-based, API-supporting fake caller ID/SMS number supporting DIY service, and discuss its relevance in the overall increase in TDoS underground market propositions. More details:
Android.RoidSec has the package name “cn.phoneSync”, but an application name of “wifi signal Fix”. From a ‘Malware 101′ standpoint, you would think the creators would have a descriptive package name that matches the application name. Not so, in this case. So what is Android.RoidSec? It’s a nasty, malicious app that sits in the background (and avoids installing any launcher icon) while collecting all sorts of info-stealing goodness.