Thanks to basic disruptive factors like standardization, DIY (do it yourself) underground market releases, Cybercrime-as-a-Service “value added” propositions, efficiency-centered client-side exploitation process, QA (Quality Assurance), and adaptation to the ubiquitous endpoint protection mechanisms, such as for instance, signatures-based antivirus scanning, the cybercrime ecosystem is currently enjoying the monetary joys of its mature state. In this post, I’ll profile a recently advertised DIY IRC-based DDoS bot, with an emphasis on how market followers, like the author of the bot, attempt to steal market share from the competition. Successful or not, this trend has been taking place for years, and based on the positive type and number of “satisfied customer” comments […]
Posts Tagged: DDOS
On a daily basis, new market entrants into the cybercrime ecosystem attempt to monetize their coding skills by releasing and branding new DIY DDoS malware loaders. Largely dominated by “me too” features, these DIY malware loaders are purposely released with prices lower than the prices of competing bots, in an attempt by the cybercriminal behind them to gain market share – a necessary prerequisite for a successful long-term oriented business model. In this post, I’ll profile a recently released Russian DDoS malware bot. More details:
Over the last couple of years, the modular and open source nature of today’s modern DDoS (distributed denial of service) bots inevitably resulted in the rise of the DDoS for hire and DDoS extortion monetization schemes within the cybercrime ecosystem. These maturing business models require constant innovation on behalf of the cybercriminals providing the easy to use and manage DIY DDoS bots, the foundation of these business models. What are some of the latest developments in this field? Are the malware coders behind these releases actually innovating, or are they basically re-branding old malware bots and reintroducing them on the […]
Thanks to the increasing availability of custom coded DDoS modules within popular malware and crimeware releases, opportunistic cybercriminals are easily developing managed DDoS for hire, also known as “rent a botnet” services, next to orchestrating largely under-reported DDoS extortion campaigns against financial institutions and online gambling web sites. In this post, I’ll profile a managed DDoS for hire service, offering to “take down your competitor’s web sites offline in a cost-effective manner”. More details:
With politically motivated DDoS (distributed denial of service attack) attacks proliferating along with the overall increase in the supply of managed “DDoS for hire” services, it’s time to get back the basics, and find out just what makes an average DDoS bot used by cybercriminals successful. Continuing the “A peek inside…” series, in this post I’ll profile the Darkness X (Optima) DDoS bot, available for purchase at selected cybercrime-friendly online communities since 2009. More details:
by Dancho Danchev With DDoS extortion and DDoS for hire attacks proliferating, next to the ever decreasing price for renting a botnet, it shouldn’t come as a surprise that cybercriminals are constantly experimenting with new DDoS tools. In this post, I’ll profile a newly released DDoS bot, namely v2 of the Cythosia DDoS bot.
by Dancho Danchev Malicious attackers quickly adapt to emerging trends, and therefore constantly produce new malicious releases. One of these recently released underground tools, is the PickPocket Botnet, a web-based command and control interface for controlling a botnet. Let’s review its core features, and find out just how easy it is to purchase it within the cybercrime ecosystem.
An insidious new Trojan that finds its way onto Windows PCs in the course of a drive-by infection employs a novel method to propagate: It connects to Web servers using stolen FTP credentials, and if successful, modifies any HTML and PHP files with extra code. The code opens an iFrame pointing to a page that loads browser exploits. The exploit pushes down the infection, which then perpetuates the process. The initial infection vector in this case was a spam message supposedly from Amazon.com containing a link to the page which performs the drive-by attacks. The malware, which we’re calling Trojan-Backdoor-Protard, […]