In a cybercrime ecosystem dominated by DIY (do-it-yourself) malware/botnet generating releases, populating multiple market segments on a systematic basis, cybercriminals continue seeking new ways to acquire and efficiently monetize fraudulently obtained accounting data, for the purpose of achieving a positive ROI (Return on Investment) on their fraudulent operations. In a series of blog posts, we’ve been detailing the existence of commercially available server-based malicious script/iframe injecting/embedding releases/platforms utilizing legitimate infrastructure for the purpose of hijacking legitimate traffic, ultimately infecting tens of thousands of legitimate users. We’ve recently spotted a long-run Web-based managed malicious/iframe injecting/embedding service relying on compromised accounting data for legitimate traffic acquisition […]
Posts Tagged: iframe
It’s that time of the year! The moment when we reflect back on the cybercrime tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) that shaped 2013, in order to constructively speculate on what’s to come for 2014 in terms of fraudulent and malicious campaigns, orchestrated by opportunistic cybercriminal adversaries across the globe. Throughout 2013, we continued to observe and profile TTPs, which were crucial for the success, profitability and growth of the cybercrime ecosystem internationally, such as, for instance, widespread proliferation of the campaigns, professionalism and the implementation of basic business/economic/marketing concepts, improved QA (Quality Assurance), vertical integration in an attempt to occupy […]
Ever since we exposed and profiled the evasive, multi-hop, mass iframe campaign that affected thousands of Web sites in November, we continued to monitor it, believing that the cybercriminal(s) behind it, would continue operating it, basically switching to new infrastructure once the one exposed in the post got logically blacklisted, thereby undermining the impact of the campaign internationally. Not surprisingly, we were right. The campaign is not only still proliferating, but the adversaries behind it have also (logically) switched the actual hosting infrastructure. Let’s dissect the currently active malicious iframe campaign that continues to serving a cocktail of (patched) client-side […]
Sharing is caring. In this post, I’ll put the spotlight on a currently circulating, massive — thousands of sites affected — malicious iframe campaign, that attempts to drop malicious software on the hosts of unaware Web site visitors through a cocktail of client-side exploits. The campaign, featuring a variety of evasive tactics making it harder to analyze, continues to efficiently pop up on thousands of legitimate Web sites. Ultimately hijacking the legitimate traffic hitting them and successfully undermining the confidentiality and integrity of the affected users’ hosts.
We’ve intercepted a currently trending malicious iframe campaign, affecting hundreds of legitimate Web sites, that’s interestingly part of the very same infrastructure from May, 2013′s analysis of the compromise of an Indian government Web site. The good news? Not only have we got you proactively covered, but also, the iframe domain is currently redirecting to a client-side exploit serving URL that’s offline. Let’s provide some actionable intelligence on the malicious activity that is known to have originated from the same iframe campaign in the past month, indicating that the cybercriminal(s) behind it are actively multi-tasking on multiple fronts.
We’ve intercepted an ongoing malicious campaign, relying on injected/embedded iFrames at Web sites acting as intermediaries for a successful client-side exploits to take place. Let’s dissect the campaign, expose the malicious domains portfolio/infrastructure it relies on, as well as directly connect it with historical malicious activity, in this particular case, a social engineering campaign pushing fake browser updates.
Thanks to the free, commercial availability of mass Web site hacking tools, in combination with hundreds of thousands of misconfigured and unpatched Web sites, blogs and forums currently susceptible to exploitation, cybercriminals are successfully monetizing the compromise process. They are setting up iFrame based traffic E-shops and offering access to hijacked legitimate traffic to be later on converted to malware-infected hosts. Despite the fact that the iFrame traffic E-shop that I’ll discuss in this post is pitching itself as a “legitimate traffic service”, it’s also explicitly emphasizing on the fact that iFrame based traffic is perfectly suitable to be used […]
The list of monetization tactics a cybercriminal can take advantage of, once they manage to hijack a huge portion of Web traffic, is virtually limitless and is entirely based on his experience within the cybercrime ecosystem. Through the utilization of blackhat SEO (search engine optimization), RFI (Remote File Inclusion), DNS cache poisoning, or direct impersonation of popular brands in spam/phishing campaigns tactics, on a daily basis, traffic is sold and resold for achieving a customer’s or a seller’s fraudulent/malicious objectives, and is then most commonly converted to malware-infected hosts. In this post, I’ll profile two cybercrime-friendly iFrame traffic exchanges, with the […]
Throughout the last couple of years, the persistent demand for geolocated traffic coming from both legitimate traffic exchanges or purely malicious ones — think traffic acquisition through illegally embedded iFrames — has been contributing to the growing market segment where traffic is bought, sold and re-sold, for the sole purpose of monetizing it through illegal means. The ultimately objective? Expose users visiting compromised, or blackhat SEO-friendly automatically generated sites with bogus content, to fraudulent or malicious content in the form of impersonations of legitimate Web sites seeking accounting data, or client-side exploits silently served in an attempt to have an […]
In a series of blog posts shedding more light into the emergence of the boutique cybercrime ‘enterprise’, we’ve been profiling underground market propositions that continue populating the cybercrime ecosystem on a daily basis, but fail to result in any widespread damage or introduce potential ecosystem disrupting features. Despite these observations, the novice cybercriminals behind them continue earning revenue from fellow cybercriminals, continue generating and maintaining their botnets, and, just like small businesses in a legitimate economy model, continue to collectively occupy a significant market share within the cybercrime ecosystem. In this post, I’ll profile a self-service type of boutique iFrame […]