Industry Intel

Sticking to good old fashioned TTPs (tactics, techniques and procedures), cybercriminals continue mixing purely malicious infrastructures with legitimate ones, for the purpose of abusing the clean IP reputations of networks, on their way to achieving positive ROI (return on investment) for their fraudulent activities. For years, this mix of infrastructures has lead to the emergence of the ‘malicious economies of scale’ concept, in terms of efficient abuse of legitimate Web properties, next to the intersection of cybercriminal online activity, and cyber warfare.

In a series of blog posts, we’ve been emphasizing on the level of automation and QA (Quality Assurance) applied by vendors of cybercrime-friendly tools and services, compromised/hacked Web shells in particular. Largely utilized for the hosting of fraudulent/malicious content, in addition to acting as stepping stones for the purpose of providing a cybercriminal with the necessary degree of anonymity when launching campaigns, the concept continues representing an inseparable part of the cybercrime ecosystem, due to the ever-green public/OTC (over-the-counter) marketplace for high page-ranked Web shells.

We’ve recently spotted a newly released commercial Windows-based compromised/hacked Web shells management application that empowers potential cybercriminals with the necessary capabilities to maintain and manage their portfolio of Web shells. Let’s take a peek at the application, and discuss some of its features.

More details:

read more…

Opportunistic cybercriminals continue ‘innovating’ through the systematic release of DIY (do-it-yourself), Web-based, botnet/malware generating tools, seeking to monetize their coding ‘know-how’ and overall understanding of abusive/fraudulent/malicious TTPs (tactics, techniques and procedures) – all for the purpose of achieving a positive ROI with each new release.

We’ve recently spotted a newly released, Web-based DNS amplification enabled DDoS bot, and not only managed to connect it to what was once an active DDoS attack, but also, to the abuse of a publicly accessible open DNS resolver which has been set up for research purposes. Let’s discuss some of its features and take a peek at the bot’s Web-based command and control interface.

More details:

read more…

The threat landscape today is very different from a few years ago. With an increasingly creative number of threat vectors through which to launch an attack, it has never been more challenging to secure our data and devices in all the ways we connect. In today’s hyper-dynamic landscape, well over 8 million malware variants are discovered each month. The majority are financially motivated, very low in volume and very sophisticated. On the mobile front, cybercriminals have shown a clear focus on compromising devices made evident by an explosion in the discovery of malicious mobile apps and websites. Also on the rise are attacks orchestrated by organized cybercrime rings which are now focused on large retail establishments, department stores and hotel chains. And of course, there is the ever persistent battle of state vs. state cyber espionage with hacktivists vying for influence. With such a complex and diverse threat landscape, complicated by a variety of device types and platforms, providing security has only become more challenging.

Companies today struggle digesting data created by various security solutions as they all act independently from one another. For example, the network firewall doesn’t communicate or share data with the endpoint security software. As companies add on layers of protection, they are presented with additional feeds of data which, again, are all independent. This has led to solutions such as Security Information & Event Management (SIEM) systems which aim to correlate data from various independent data feeds. The problem however, is that the sources of data remain independent and unaware of each other. Additionally, data is only correlated within a single environment, unaware of other corporations and their encounters with security events. Ultimately, what this leads to is time wasted by dealing with data collection and correlation when it could be used for incidence response and remediation.

To deal with today’s threats you need the ability to transform data feeds into actionable intelligence. To succeed, you must have the ability to provide context and to show interconnectivity at a granular level, whether it be for internet security, endpoints, or mobile devices – and to do so on a large scale by correlating data from millions of sources across consumer and corporate environments alike. Data does not equal intelligence, and without a way to bring it all together, to break it down and understand it, responding to the threats at hand becomes all the more challenging. Intelligence is making sense of data and working with the results to respond, remediate, and to protect against future attack.

BrightCloud Security Services provide the necessary context, detail and interconnectedness needed to transform data into actionable intelligence.

Deceptive ads continue to represent the primary distribution vector for the vast majority of Potentially Unwanted Applications (PUAs) that we track. Primarily relying on ‘visual social engineering’ tactics, gullible end users fall victims to these privacy-violating applications, largely due to the fact that they instantaneously agree to the terms in the End User’s Agreement presented to them.

We’ve recently spotted yet another variant of the InstallBrain family of Potentially Unwanted Applications (PUA’s), tricking users into installing a bogus PC performance boosting application. Let’s assess this campaign and provide actionable intelligence on the domains/IPs and related privacy-violating MD5s known to have shared the same infrastructure as the initial PUA profiled in this post.

More details:

read more…

2013 was not a good year in terms of cyber security. Despite companies spending an increasingly significant percent of revenue on security technology – systems designed to thwart, detect and prevent hackers from gaining access to their networks and sensitive data – attacks continue to succeed.

Recently, the trend has shifted to attacking point of sale (POS) systems. While Target is the largest example, similar attacks have occurred in industries ranging from department stores to hospitals to hotel chains. Basically anywhere large scale financial transactions take place. The focus on POS systems doesn’t come as a surprise. Cybercriminals have always been after money. What is surprising, however, is how long it takes for the attacked to realize they’ve been compromised – and that’s what I’ll discuss in this blog.

I’ve chosen to use Target as an example for two reasons. First, the size and sophistication of the compromise is interesting and ideal for analysis, and the second being that Target’s example is very common to other similar attacks in the scope of realizing an attack has occurred.

So let’s start by reviewing a few facts we now know about the Target breach. While the attack began collecting credit card transaction data on November 27^th, precisely timed with Black Friday to capture as much data as possible, it wasn’t discovered until December 15^th – and it wasn’t Target who made the discovery, rather US law enforcement connected the dots and Target was informed. This is very concerning and, unfortunately, is very much the norm for most compromises. The 2013 Verizon Risk report found that in 62% of breaches, the attack went unnoticed for months or years!

Looking again at Target, we know when the collection of data began, but the initial compromise of their network happened nearly two weeks prior on November 15^th. Apparently, an employee for a HVAC service company fell for a phishing attack which ultimately infected his computer with a password stealing trojan. Target eventually used this company to assess their power and AC consumption and had provided a few employees with credentials to access their network. Once the employee with the infected PC connected to Target’s network, his credentials were stolen and later used in the attack. The big lesson here is that you are only as secure as those you trust with access to your network. In this case, a few clicks by an unsuspecting HVAC employee led to one of the largest credit card data breaches on record.

So how could all this have happened, especially to the #2 US retailer? Why was Target unable to detect the initial compromise of their network, and then unable to identify the attack once it was underway?

To answers to these questions, we first need to understand the Data Security Standards (DSS) which are provided by the Payment Card Industry (PCI) Security Standards Council or more commonly known as PCI DSS 3.0. These standards, of which Target was certified as compliant (though details of the attack show they were clearly not followed), detail 12 specific requirements to protect cardholder data, build and maintain secure networks and systems, maintain a vulnerability management program, implement strong access control measures, regularly monitor and test networks and provide an information security policy. The document is very comprehensive, and PCI DSS 3.0 does a good job of providing a framework to protect against compromise – but compromises still occur.

Some might say that PCI DSS 3.0 is to blame, and that their recommendations are not sufficient to defend against today’s sophisticated attacks – and they might be right – but I think the problem goes beyond that. While I cannot say which specific vendor security solutions were in use at Target, I know they were in place because it is required to be PCI DSS 3.0 compliant. PCI DSS 3.0 does not tell you which vendors to use, just that you must use software to protect systems from malware, or similarly, a firewall to protect your network. Here in lies the real issue – not all vendor security solutions provide the same capability or level of functionality. When considering the fact that most attacks go unnoticed for months if not longer, it seems the focus should be on technology and processes designed to frequently confirm the integrity of all involved systems. This is actually spelled out in PCI DSS 3.0 under sections 10 and 11 but the trouble is that the burden of awareness falls back to the security solution in place. And unfortunately, many endpoint solutions today are not capable of reacting to a missed infection.

So back to my original questions – how could this have happened and why did it take so long to detect?

The answer is twofold. First, Target failed to strictly follow PCI DSS 3.0 standards, especially with respect to tracking and monitoring all access to network resources and systems – and they are not alone. This is one of the more challenging standards to follow, especially for larger retailers with hundreds if not thousands of locations. But the blame isn’t solely on PCI DSS 3.0 or retailers who attempt apply their standards. The second factor is the underlying technology which is trusted and relied upon by retailers. This is a more complex issue. Retailers lack information about the metrics which matter in defending against complex and targeted attacks. Upfront detection rates are meaningless as malware for these attacks is always custom built and specific to the targeted environment. With this fact in mind, what becomes much more important is understanding a solutions ability to react to a missed threat – to understand the reaction time from first observation to identification and notification.

The attack on Target, and analysis from hundreds of other compromises, exposes there is a real weakness with awareness. Companies spend millions on security technology, trusting their investment will prevent a compromise, but the majority of today’s solutions are unable to provided what is needed – the ability to react to something new – something never encountered before.

Webroot is a pioneer in this space and the SecureAnywhere line of products were designed around improving awareness and being able to rapidly identify and instantly protect against emerging and targeted threats. This is accomplished within the Webroot Intelligence Network by focusing on what our users encounter. This approach ensures we have the necessary visibility to identify even the most targeted of attacks and applies to our endpoint, mobile and Web solutions. For more information, feel free to shoot me an email at gmilbourne@webroot.com or visit our website at http://www.webroot.com/.

We’ve just intercepted a currently circulating malicious spam campaign that’s attempting to trick potential botnet victims into thinking that they’ve received a legitimate Voice Message Notification from Skype. In reality though, once socially engineered users click on the malicious link found in the bogus emails, they’re automatically exposed to the client-side exploits served by the Angler exploit kit.

More details:

read more…

Cybercriminals continue to populate their botnets, with new infected hosts, through the persistent and systematic spamvertising of tens of thousands of fake emails which impersonate popular and well known brands – all in an attempt to socially engineer prospective victims into interacting with the scam.

We’ve recently intercepted a currently circulating malicious spam campaign, impersonating Evernote, serving client-side exploits to prospective victims who click on the links found in the fake emails.

More details:

read more…

Today, at 2014-02-12 12:16:20 (CET), we became aware of a possible evasive/beneath the radar malvertising based g01pack exploit kit attack, taking place through the DoubleClick ad network using an advertisement featured at About.com.  Investigating further, we were able to identify the actual domains/IPs involved in the campaign, and perhaps most interestingly, managed to establish a rather interesting connection between the name servers of one of the domains involved in the attacks, and what appears to be a fully operational and running Ukrainian-based ad platform, Epom in this particular case.

read more…

In a series of blog posts published throughout 2012, we’ve been highlighting the existence of a vibrant underground market segment, namely, that of ‘hacking for hire’ services, email hacking in particular. Commercially available as a service for years, the practice’s growth was once largely fueled by the release of DIY Web-based popular email provider hacking tools, which once acquired by prospective cybercriminals, quickly became the foundation for a successful business model. How have things changed nowadays, in terms of tactics, techniques and procedures? Profoundly.

Case in point, we’ve been tracking two such ‘hacking for hire’ services, both of which offer a diversified portfolio of malicious services to prospective customers, such as email hacking, Web site hacking, DDoS for hire, DDoS protection, and grade modification. What type of tactics, tools and procedures do they rely on? Let’s find out.

read more…

In a cybercrime ecosystem populated by commercially available WordPress brute-forcing and mass vulnerable WordPress installation scanning tools, cybercriminals continue actively capitalizing on the platform’s leading market share within the Content Management System’s market segment. Successfully exploiting tens of thousands of installations on a daily basis, for the purpose of utilizing the legitimate infrastructure to achieve their fraudulent/malicious campaign objectives, the tactic is also largely driven by the over-supply of compromised/accounting data, usually embedded within sophisticated Web-based attack platforms like the ones we’ve profiled in the past.

We’ve recently intercepted a malicious campaign exclusively relying on rogue WordPress sites, ultimately serving client-side exploits to users through the Magnitude Web malware exploitation kit. Despite its relatively low profile in terms of proliferation — we believe the campaign is in its early stages — it exposes a pseudo-randomly generated sub-domains based fraudulent infrastructure that is worth keeping an eye on.

read more…

In the first ThreatVlog of 2014, Marcus Moreno discusses the increase in Potentially Unwanted Applications/Programs and their impact on machines, productivity, and the user experience. Also in the video is a talk on the wonderful audio ads that have been infecting machines and annoying computer users, discussing how they get into the machine and where to find them. Finally, he talks about Microsoft’s call for all security companies to come together to help end malicious malware families.

http://youtu.be/LzaC-XIKaCA

Operational Security (OPSEC) has always been an inseparable part of the cybercrime ecosystem, especially in the context of preventing law enforcement agencies from tracking down the activities of fraudulent and malicious adversaries online. Throughout the years, the industry has witnessed active utilization of malware-infected hosts (Socks4/Socks5) as anonymization ‘stepping stones’ and the use of cybercrime-friendly VPN providers, bypassing internationally accepted data retention regulations, as some of the primary anonymization tactics used by cybercriminals. Nowadays, this set of tactics has evolved into a diversified mix of legitimate and purely malicious infrastructure that provides value-added services such as APIs supporting Socks4/Socks5 services, DIY real-time Socks4/Socks5 syndicating tools, and the development of hybrid based type of anonymous ‘solutions’. These services empower cybercriminals with the necessary ‘know-how’ to  conceal their activities online, and there is a as clear attempt to standardize this ‘know-how’ through the distribution of commercial OPSEC training manuals.

read more…